基于損失厭惡和損失概率厭惡的績效薪酬模型研究.pdf

1、分類號：C93 密級：公開 UDC：331.1 學(xué)校代碼：11065 碩士學(xué)位論文 基于損失厭惡和損失概率厭惡的 基于損失厭惡和損失概率厭惡的 績效薪酬模型研究 績效薪酬模型研究 孫杉 指 導(dǎo) 教 師 胡勁松教授 學(xué)科專業(yè)名稱 管理科學(xué)與工程 論文答辯日期 2017 年 6 月 3 日 Abstract In the process of pro

2、duction and operation of the enterprise, the purpose of the business owner is to obtain the maximum profit, and profit is inseparable from the hard work of the staff. How to effectively moti

3、vate the efforts of employees is the key to improve the production, ensure product quality, and further expand the market share, enhance the market competitiveness of enterprises. Therefore, it has imp

4、ortant significance and great research value to design a scientific and efficient pay for performance incentive mechanism. Based on the principal- agent theory, considered the production relations that output

5、 is influenced by the agent's effort level and interference factors in the process of production, researched the pay for performance design problem between the principal with different behavior

6、 characteristics and the agent with different behavior characteristics under bounded rationality. Using the cumulative prospect theory, characterized the sense of the principal and the agent to profit under b

7、ounded rationality, and analyzed the behavior choice of the agent and the principal. The paper explains the influence of each factor on the behavior choice and the perceived value of the prin

8、cipal and agent by the way of illustration. This paper first studied the behavior choice and profit of the principal and agent under the full rational pay for performance model, and analyzed

9、the influence of basic wage and production capacity of the enterprise on the agent (or principal)behavior and profit by the way of illustration. Then study the pay for performance model with

10、loss aversion behavior, and analyzed the influence of each factor on the behavior choice and perceived value of the principal and agent after the bounded rationality behavior characteristics added

11、. Finally added the probabilistic loss aversion behavior characteristics to the pay for performance model. Using prospect theory. Using cumulative prospect theory, analyzed the influence of each factor on the

12、behavior choice and perceived value of the principal and agent after loss aversion behavior and probabilistic loss aversion behavior added with discontinuous decision weights function form. The results show