中國政府審計(jì)：問題和改革外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文4010字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 政府審計(jì)公告制度的現(xiàn)狀分析及其對(duì)策 </p><p>　　專 業(yè) 會(huì) 計(jì) 學(xué)

2、 </p><p>　　外文題目 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform</p><p>　　外文出處 《Government auditing in China: Problems and </p><p>　　reform》[N]. incorporating Adv

3、ances in International</p><p>　　Accounting 2008，(24)：119-127 </p><p>　　外文作者 楊壽昌，賈森澤忠孝，莫里斯彭德爾伯里 </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Governmen

4、t auditing in China: Problems and reform</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　For 30 years after its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China went through a series of major mass polit

5、ical movements which left it extremely isolated from the rest of the world, especially capitalist countries. At the brink of a total economic collapse, China shifted its focus to economic development, began market-orient

6、ed economic reforms, and adopted an open-door policy in 1978.3 These changes revived both government auditing and independent auditing , which had been replaced by o</p><p>　　As required by the 1982 Constitu

7、tion of the People's Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of prov

8、incial, municipal and county governments. A regional government audit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit o

9、ffice of a provincial government</p><p>　　Although this government audit system has made significant contributions toward China's economic reform and opening up to the world in the past 20 years (Chinese

10、 Auditing System Research Group, 1999), it also suffers from the lack of audit independence. The existing problems of government auditing mainly stem from it being under the direct control of the executive body (the Stat

11、e Council). Under this system, various government departments and officials can, both theoretically and practically, in</p><p>　　Notwithstanding these problems, the NAO has stepped up the level of public dis

12、closure of audit findings in recent years. In 2003, the NAO for the first time disclosed to the public that serious financial problems existed in four ministries of the central government. This disclosure and the problem

13、s exposed attracted much media attention and the phrase “Audit Storm” was used to refer to the disclosure and the issues raised. This “Audit Storm” continued in 2004 and 2005 when the NAO in its annual </p><p&

14、gt;　　2. Perceived problems of the current government auditing system</p><p>　　Most interviewees believed that the current problems of government auditing have their origins in its relation to the government,

15、 i.e., the NAO is in effect an internal auditing department under the government's direct control. The following paragraphs elaborate the main problems identified in the interviews.</p><p>　　2.1. Lack of

16、 audit independence</p><p>　　The majority of our interviewees acknowledged some direct or indirect intervention by people or organisations from outside the NAO. These have a strong negative impact on audit p

17、lanning, the training and appointment of auditing personnel, the determination of audit tasks, the dealing with problems identified in the audit, and the disclosure of audit results. As a result, theNAOcan hardly perform

18、 any independent auditing. A director-general of a provincial government audit office commented: The p</p><p>　　Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of independence of government auditing, but at the same

19、 time they did not want to exaggerate the problem. Being a department directed by the government, how can the audit officework independently free from the interference of the government or the chief government officers (

20、CGO)? Is the result of interference inevitably detrimental? The interviewees found it hard to answer these questions. Besides, the audit office and the government are at different admin</p><p>　　We argue tha

21、t if auditing is supposed to satisfy merely the needs of the government, or if government audit is supposed to play a supporting role to governmental work, then the problem of limited audit independence is relatively par

22、tial, because government auditing still achieves its main objective. But if the people's congress and taxpayers outside the government are also audit clients, and entrust the government audit office to investigate ho

23、w the government implemented fiscal budgets approved</p><p>　　2.2. Restricted disclosure of audit results</p><p>　　The interviewees generally felt that the disclosure of audit results might be r

24、estricted. A deputy CGO (a deputy mayor) of a municipal government commented in the interview: The audit report follows governmental arrangements, but this does not necessarily indicate that the government will prevent t

25、he disclosure of audit issues. Whoever acts as the CGO faces external pressure and thus s/he will disclose something, explain it to the people's congress, and also save the face of the audit office. Bu</p><

26、;p>　　An official from the NAO also admitted in the interview that some local governments and related authorities interfere with the disclosure of audit findings and the resolution of audit results in order to shirk re

27、sponsibilities and avoid excessive disclosure that might overshadow their political career. The interview data thus suggests that the audit office is not only constrained by the government in terms of audit planning and

28、the determination of audit tasks, but also the disclosure of audit r</p><p>　　2.3. Auditing gaps</p><p>　　Most interviewees mentioned the same problem; the audit is only applied to government un

29、its at a lower level of the hierarchy. That is, the audit rarely examines the responsibility and performance of the government itself or its CGO, and hence the depth, level, and scope of auditing are rather restricted. T

30、he following comment made by an interviewee who is a director-general at the NAO is representative of the views. From a legal point of view, there will not be any constraint on the audit of de</p><p>　　Some

31、of our interviewees also mentioned that in budget auditing, since the audit does not actually involve the financial responsibility and performance of the government and its CGO, it is unavoidable that many big issues are

32、 overlooked or neglected, especially those related to the government or CGOs themselves. Given that many problems result from governmental activity, the audit office can do nothing and the problems can appear over and ov

33、er again. This kind of auditing exhibits a serious prob</p><p>　　2.4. Budget audit as a mere formality</p><p>　　Some interviewees questioned whether audit results would be reported accurately to

34、 the people's congress even if the audit office carried out budget auditing at the government level. If the government determines the content of the audit report, budget auditing is in effect the government's “se

35、lf-inspection”. The Constitution (PRC, 1982) empowers the CGO with respect to both auditing and financial matters. However, in many local governments, the CGO holds the financial decision-making powers whil</p>&l

36、t;p>　　Moreover, as the relationship between the people's congress and the government is that of supervisor and supervisee, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the government audit office to serve two “masters”

37、. In such a conflicting situation, the government audit office can only put the government's interests and requirements first, since the government is its direct “boss”. To serve the government in essence and the peo

38、ple's congress in appearance is an inevitable choice of the government audit </p><p>　　The legislature therefore cannot directly exercise audit supervision and can only indirectly monitor the fiscal budg

39、et through auditing. The legislature also lacks other practical approaches and tools for monitoring the implementation of fiscal budgets and this limits its ability to obtain an insight into the workings of financial sys

40、tems and budget implementation. The legislature can therefore play a very limited role in monitoring financial systems and fiscal budgets.</p><p>　　3. Reforming and Conclusion</p><p>　　We carrie

41、d out interviews in 2002 in order to comprehend and evaluate the current government auditing systemin China and identify a rational and feasible approach to reforming the system. We also examined the impact of the recent

42、 “Audit Storm” on the government auditing system. The results of our investigation show that the current government auditing system in China lacks independence and transparency. The lack of independence affects the objec

43、tivity and reliability of auditing which is particu</p><p>　　Our analysis of the “Audit Storm” shows that ithas increased auditing transparency and attracted much attention from the public, the NPC officials

44、, academics, and government officials to the serious problems in managing public finance. It has also shown that government auditing has an important role to play in protecting public interests. However, merely drawing a

45、ttention to the problems cannot prevent them from recurring. Also, government censorship means that many problems are not disclosed an</p><p>　　The “Legislature Approach” has been widely discussed among Chin

46、ese academics. Although it emphasises audit independence, it neglects the centralised nature of the government structure, the political tension between the government and the legislature, and the problems that the legisl

47、ature itself faces. Therefore, implementing this approach in the current political climate may weaken the government's economic control and require a major restructuring of the government and the legislature, thus la

48、c</p><p>　　To smooth this proposed transition, we put forward a “Dual-Track System” as an interim step toward a fully-fledged legislature-led state audit system. Our proposal suggests that the legislature an

49、d the government should set up separate audit organisations to exercise different audit responsibilities. The “Dual-Track System” takes into account both the need to improve audit independence and the feasibility of refo

50、rm. This approach satisfies the increasing will of the Chinese legislature to streng</p><p>　　Source:Suchang Yang , Jason Zezhong Xiao , Maurice Pendlebury .Government auditing in China: Problems and reform[

51、N].Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting，2008，(24)：119-127.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　中國政府審計(jì)：問題和改革</p><p><b>　　1、簡介</b&g

52、t;</p><p>　　1949年后的30年，中華人民共和國經(jīng)歷了一系列重要大眾政治運(yùn)動(dòng),使它在世界各地極其孤立，特別是資本主義國家。在一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)全面崩潰的邊緣，中國將重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，開始了以市場為導(dǎo)向的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，并通過了1978年3月的門戶開放政策，同時(shí)恢復(fù)政府審計(jì)與獨(dú)立審計(jì)并取代了20世紀(jì)50年代所實(shí)行的監(jiān)測機(jī)制。</p><p>　　按照中華人民共和國1982年憲法規(guī)定，國家審計(jì)

53、署（NAO）作為國務(wù)院的部門成立于1983年。此外，區(qū)域?qū)徲?jì)辦公室還成立了省，市，縣政府部門。一個(gè)地區(qū)的政府審計(jì)辦公室是根據(jù)雙方的政府審計(jì)辦公室在更高水平上監(jiān)督區(qū)政府的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。例如，一個(gè)省級(jí)政府審計(jì)辦公室是受審計(jì)署和省級(jí)政府共同領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。在雙重領(lǐng)導(dǎo)體制下，為省政府審計(jì)署，審計(jì)署的審計(jì)和監(jiān)管提供指導(dǎo)和監(jiān)督，而省政府提供資源和演習(xí)人員控制。此外，審計(jì)署經(jīng)營在中央部委和分支機(jī)構(gòu)網(wǎng)絡(luò)非常大的直轄市審計(jì)根據(jù)中央的政府來管制各政府部門，機(jī)構(gòu)，國有企業(yè)，其

54、他關(guān)聯(lián)機(jī)構(gòu)。這些分支審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)各部委由超大型城市設(shè)下的國家審計(jì)署直接領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。</p><p>　　雖然在過去的20年，這個(gè)政府審計(jì)制度已給中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革開放做出了重大貢獻(xiàn)（中國審計(jì)制度的研究小組，1999年），但是在面向世界時(shí)也遭受了缺乏審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的質(zhì)疑。政府審計(jì)中存在的問題主要源于其下的行政機(jī)構(gòu)（國務(wù)院）的直接控制之下。在這個(gè)制度下，各政府部門和官員可以在理論和實(shí)踐中干擾政府審計(jì)，從而削弱了審計(jì)的客觀性和公正性。然

55、而，隨著審計(jì)報(bào)告越來越多的使用，各級(jí)人民代表大會(huì)也開始重視其重要意義。與此同時(shí)，越來越多的納稅人開始注意他們的錢是如何由政府使用。雖然審計(jì)署的缺乏獨(dú)立性一直是公司成立以來的問題，這個(gè)問題正在創(chuàng)造出越來越多的創(chuàng)造了電流，因?yàn)閱栘?zé)的政治環(huán)境日益引起了立法機(jī)關(guān)和納稅人的關(guān)注。政府與立法機(jī)關(guān)之間的關(guān)系受到損害責(zé)任的事實(shí)是審計(jì)人員不獨(dú)立于政府的重大原因。</p><p>　　由于存在這些問題，審計(jì)署已加緊在近幾年的審計(jì)結(jié)果

56、公開披露的水平。 2003年，審計(jì)署首次向公眾披露了四個(gè)中央部委存在的嚴(yán)重財(cái)政問題。此披露和曝光的問題備受媒體的關(guān)注，“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”一次也由此而來。在2004年和2005年，在其年度報(bào)告中披露了審計(jì)署對(duì)中央其他部委的嚴(yán)重違法行為。然而，盡管這場風(fēng)暴已在提請(qǐng)人們注意所發(fā)生的問題，但是審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的一些有用的手段，只有一小部分的總暴露。此外，即使問題暴露出來，這并不能確保不會(huì)再發(fā)生同樣的問題。因此，“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”已加深了對(duì)政府審計(jì)改革必要性的認(rèn)識(shí)

57、。</p><p>　　2、當(dāng)前政府審計(jì)制度審計(jì)改革已知的問題</p><p>　　大部分受訪者認(rèn)為當(dāng)前的政府審計(jì)的問題是與政府密切相關(guān)的，這實(shí)際上是一種行為的內(nèi)部審計(jì)部門在政府的直接控制。以下各段闡述的訪談中發(fā)現(xiàn)的主要問題。</p><p>　?。?）缺乏審計(jì)獨(dú)立性</p><p>　　我們的大多數(shù)受訪者承認(rèn)，審計(jì)署的一些人或組織從外面直接

58、或間接干預(yù)。在審計(jì)發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題時(shí)，與審計(jì)結(jié)果公開，這些審計(jì)規(guī)劃，培訓(xùn)和審計(jì)人員的任命，對(duì)審計(jì)任務(wù)的決心具有強(qiáng)大消極影響。因此，審計(jì)署也很難執(zhí)行任何獨(dú)立審計(jì)。一個(gè)審計(jì)局局長說道：在審計(jì)中發(fā)現(xiàn)問題應(yīng)依法處理，但如果問題涉及到政府，審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)將將會(huì)干擾負(fù)責(zé)的政府官員或其他機(jī)關(guān)。</p><p>　　一些受訪者承認(rèn)政府審計(jì)缺乏獨(dú)立性，但同時(shí)他們也不想夸大這個(gè)問題。由政府指導(dǎo)的一個(gè)部門，審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)如何能從政府或行政政府官員的干預(yù)

59、中獨(dú)立工作？這是不可避免的結(jié)果。受訪者覺得難以回答這些問題。此外，審計(jì)署和政府是在不同的行政級(jí)別，對(duì)審計(jì)可能并不總有一致的看法。在這種情況下，如在訪談中透露，審計(jì)署處在較低水平者，通常會(huì)按照政府的意志來執(zhí)行——這是可以理解的。</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)為，如果審計(jì)僅僅滿足政府的需要，或者如果政府審計(jì)發(fā)揮作用，支持政府工作為政府審計(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)其主要目標(biāo)，那么，有限的審計(jì)獨(dú)立性問題是比較片面的。但如果人民代表大會(huì)代表和政

60、府以外的納稅人也是審計(jì)客戶，并委托政府審計(jì)辦公室，由人民代表大會(huì)通過研究如何將政府推行財(cái)政預(yù)算，那么審計(jì)辦公室和政府控制之間的關(guān)系將成為一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題。一個(gè)審計(jì)缺乏獨(dú)立性的直接后果是，審計(jì)報(bào)告可能不再具備客觀性和公正性，因此，不太可能獲得人民代表大會(huì)代表和公眾的信任和接受。</p><p>　?。?）限制披露審計(jì)結(jié)果</p><p>　　受訪者普遍認(rèn)為，審計(jì)結(jié)果的披露可能會(huì)受到限制。CGO政

61、府的副市長在接受采訪時(shí)評(píng)論說：審計(jì)報(bào)告按照政府的安排，但這并不一定表示政府將防止審計(jì)問題披露。無論誰擔(dān)任，政府總部面臨的外部壓力使得她/他會(huì)透露一些東西，解釋給人民代表大會(huì)，同時(shí)也節(jié)省了審計(jì)署的時(shí)間。但是，政府總部將怎樣披露所有的問題或重要的問題呢？有關(guān)的問題將會(huì)在他的年度報(bào)告中予以披露？這是一個(gè)永遠(yuǎn)無法知道的問題。審計(jì)署的一位官員指出：事實(shí)上，一些政府官員干涉審計(jì)署審計(jì)結(jié)果報(bào)告給人大。他們甚至要求審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)直接刪除違反規(guī)定的審計(jì)報(bào)告大問

62、題。</p><p>　　在對(duì)審計(jì)署的官方采訪中也了解到，一些地方政府和相關(guān)部門的審計(jì)結(jié)果披露和審計(jì)結(jié)果決議，以推卸責(zé)任，避免過多的披露，可能掩蓋其政治生涯的干涉。這樣的訪談資料顯示，審計(jì)局是不僅在規(guī)劃方面，還在政府審計(jì)和審計(jì)任務(wù)的決心對(duì)審計(jì)結(jié)果披露進(jìn)行限制。也就是說，對(duì)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)透露什么，如何披露，以及何時(shí)公開自己的決定進(jìn)行限制。因此，沒有對(duì)審計(jì)報(bào)告的權(quán)威性和透明度的保證。隨著審計(jì)報(bào)告提交給人大，這就說明缺乏獨(dú)立

63、性和透明度的問題已引起日益關(guān)注。因?yàn)閼椃ǎㄖ腥A人民共和國，1982年）和審計(jì)法（中華人民共和國，1994年）缺乏明確和嚴(yán)格的審計(jì)結(jié)果，內(nèi)容和當(dāng)前審計(jì)系統(tǒng)信息披露程度的披露有分歧，以及政府的自由裁量對(duì)政府事務(wù)進(jìn)行披露政策截尾規(guī)則，也嚴(yán)重影響了CGOs的態(tài)度。</p><p><b>　　（3）審計(jì)差距</b></p><p>　　多數(shù)受訪者提到了同一問題;審計(jì)是只適用于

64、在一個(gè)較低的水平層次的政府單位。也就是說，審計(jì)能檢查的責(zé)任和政府本身或政府總部的性能很少，因此深度，水平和審計(jì)范圍是相當(dāng)有限。以下是由審計(jì)署總干事提出的代表性意見。從法律的角度來看，不會(huì)有任何更高級(jí)別的官員作出審計(jì)決定的約束，但實(shí)際上，你不能真正問他們。如果我們在審計(jì)過程中發(fā)現(xiàn)的問題或由高級(jí)別官員作出錯(cuò)誤的決定，我們寧愿不予以披露。我們假設(shè)政府總是不正確的事情。這就是說，如果問題是由政府作出的決定產(chǎn)生的，我們不會(huì)理會(huì)他們。這樣我們?nèi)绾文?/p>

65、監(jiān)督我們的上司？我們只是一個(gè)政府部門。</p><p>　　我們的受訪者有些人還提到，在預(yù)算審查，因?yàn)閷?shí)際上并沒有涉及審計(jì)的財(cái)務(wù)責(zé)任和政府及其政府總部的性能，這是不可避免的，許多大問題被忽略或忽視，特別是有關(guān)政府或CGOs自己?？紤]到許多問題，從政府活動(dòng)的結(jié)果上看，審計(jì)署可以什么也不做，可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)的問題一遍又一遍。這種審計(jì)展覽中的一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題是中央集權(quán)力量。</p><p>　?。?）預(yù)算

66、審計(jì)作為一種走過場</p><p>　　一些受訪者質(zhì)疑，審計(jì)結(jié)果將準(zhǔn)確地向人民代表大會(huì)報(bào)告即使審計(jì)局開展了政府一級(jí)預(yù)算審計(jì)。如果政府決定了審計(jì)報(bào)告的內(nèi)容，預(yù)算審計(jì)是政府的“自我檢查”之功效。憲法（中華人民共和國，1982年）兩方面授權(quán)審計(jì)和財(cái)務(wù)事項(xiàng)的政府總部。然而，在許多地方政府，政府總部舉行的財(cái)務(wù)決策而下一級(jí)采取委托負(fù)責(zé)審計(jì)的權(quán)力。這種情況審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)在監(jiān)察財(cái)政和政府及其政府總部的金融活動(dòng)時(shí)可能會(huì)變得更加困難了，只

67、是因?yàn)椴辉敢獗┞墩胁康谋锥恕＿@是由一個(gè)受訪者，一名副主任，省級(jí)政府審計(jì)辦公室干事的發(fā)言反映：困難在于審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)在執(zhí)行財(cái)政預(yù)算審計(jì)面臨的真正的巨大的壓力，因?yàn)樨?cái)政和金融權(quán)力安息在中區(qū)政府合署手中。重要的財(cái)政和金融問題和年度財(cái)政財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)算必須由政府總部決定。一旦預(yù)算設(shè)置，任何預(yù)算的調(diào)整也必須經(jīng)政府批準(zhǔn)和中區(qū)政府合署。在這種情況下，審計(jì)財(cái)政財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)算將等同于政府的審計(jì)，它的中區(qū)政府合署。因此，審計(jì)人員面臨的不僅是財(cái)政部門，而是政府總部。在審計(jì)過

68、程中，如果財(cái)政部門告訴審計(jì)人員說，中區(qū)政府合署不準(zhǔn)許被審計(jì)的東西，那么，審計(jì)人員將沒有訪問的必要。</p><p>　　此外，由于人大和政府之間的關(guān)系是監(jiān)督和監(jiān)管，這是困難的，因?yàn)檎畬徲?jì)辦公室為兩個(gè)“主人”。在這種沖突的情況下，政府審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)只能把政府的利益和要求放在第一，因?yàn)檎闹苯印袄习濉笔撬槿嗣穹?wù)在本質(zhì)上和人民代表大會(huì)的政府在外觀上是一種政府審計(jì)辦公室在現(xiàn)行制度下的必然選擇。</p>

69、<p>　　因此，立法機(jī)關(guān)不能直接行使審計(jì)監(jiān)督和監(jiān)測只能間接地通過審計(jì)財(cái)政預(yù)算。立法機(jī)關(guān)也缺乏監(jiān)督財(cái)政預(yù)算執(zhí)行情況其他的實(shí)用方法和工具，這限制了它的能力，以獲得對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)制度和預(yù)算執(zhí)行的運(yùn)作的了解。因此，立法機(jī)關(guān)能夠在監(jiān)測金融體系和財(cái)政預(yù)算時(shí)起到十分有限的作用。</p><p><b>　　3、改革和總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　我們進(jìn)行了面談，以便在200

70、2年理解和評(píng)估目前中國政府審計(jì)系統(tǒng)，并確定一個(gè)合理的，可行的改革制度。我們還研究了近期的“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”的政府審計(jì)制度的影響。我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，目前中國政府審計(jì)制度缺乏獨(dú)立性和透明度。缺乏獨(dú)立性會(huì)影響審計(jì)的客觀性和可靠性，這一點(diǎn)尤其重要，當(dāng)審計(jì)實(shí)施時(shí)，使用和控制的預(yù)算資金由中央和地方政府支付。正是這種政府審計(jì)才會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)獨(dú)立性產(chǎn)生最大的需要。</p><p>　　我們對(duì)“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”的分析表明，它的身體增加了審計(jì)的透明

71、度，吸引公眾的關(guān)注全國人大的官員，學(xué)者和政府官員處理管理公共財(cái)政的嚴(yán)重問題。它也表明，政府審計(jì)在保護(hù)公眾利益方面具有重要的作用。然而，僅僅提請(qǐng)注意的問題，卻不能防止他們再次發(fā)生。此外，政府的審查意味著許多問題沒有披露，它已被證明難以擴(kuò)展的“審計(jì)風(fēng)暴”到地方審計(jì)部門。所有這些弱點(diǎn)是植根于獨(dú)立在目前的政府審計(jì)制度的缺乏。</p><p>　　中國學(xué)者在“立法法”中得到了廣泛的討論。雖然它強(qiáng)調(diào)審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，但是它忽視了

72、政府結(jié)構(gòu)，政府與立法機(jī)關(guān)的政治主張，以及立法本身的問題和面臨的集權(quán)性。因此，在目前的政治氣候下實(shí)施這一做法可能會(huì)削弱政府的經(jīng)濟(jì)管制和對(duì)政府和立法機(jī)關(guān)重大重組的要求，缺乏實(shí)用性和可行性。</p><p>　　為了順利完成這一提議的過渡，我們提出了作為實(shí)現(xiàn)向一個(gè)完全成熟的立法主導(dǎo)國家審計(jì)體制的過渡措施是“雙軌制”。我們的提案建議，立法機(jī)關(guān)和政府應(yīng)設(shè)立采取不同的審計(jì)責(zé)任的獨(dú)立的審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)。在“雙軌制”下考慮到雙方的需要，